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ARGUMENT
The Maqistrate Erred By Dismissing The License Suspension Proceedings
A.

Introduction
The magistrate dismissed license suspension proceedings for refusal to

take a requested BAC test. (R., p. 33.) The grounds the magistrate provided for
his actions were that the officer's sworn statement of refusal had been filed in the
court more than seven days after the refusal and that the rights advisory (seeR.,
p. 9) was vague as related to seizing out-of-state drivers' licenses such as
Kling's. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 7-1 1; p. 13, L. 19 - p. 14, L. 10.) The district court
affirmed. (R., pp. 126-37.) The magistrate erred in dismissing (and the district
court in not reversing on appeal) because there is no seven-day filing
requirement for the officer's sworn statement and because there is no vagueness
in the advisory. (Appellant's brief.)
In response, Kling argues that the magistrate properly dismissed for lack
of a filing within seven days by the officer because (1) the magistrate had
authority from some unnamed and unstated legal source to effectuate the
effective administration of the court's business; (2) that because she had to file a
request for a hearing within seven days under the statute the officer should be
forced to file a sworn statement in the same time-frame (even though the statute
has no filing deadline for the officer's sworn statement); and (3) because a
different and inapplicable statute requires a filing by the officer before the Idaho
Transportation Department within five days, the in pari materia reading of the
applicable statue (which does not mention any time requirements for filing)

requires the filing in court of a sworn statement in seven days. (Respondent's
brief, pp. 15-20.) Kling also argues that the advisory did not strictly follow the
statute and was therefore inadequate and contends that the advisory could be
misconstrued and is therefore vague. (Respondent's brief, pp. 6-15.) None of
these arguments has merit.
B.

There Is No Seven-Day Filing Period And The Court Lacked Authority To
Arbitrarily Establish One
Neither the courts below nor Kling on appeal can point to any statute or

rule of procedure requiring an officer to file a sworn statement of refusal within
seven days. Nor can they point to any statute or rule granting magistrates the
authority to fix a seven day filing period and treat it as a jurisdictional
prerequisite. In the absence of any such authority Kling argues that the sevenday filing limitation arises out of some undefined need to impose an arbitrary
deadline to effectuate the effective administration of the court's business.
(Respondent's brief, pp. 18-19.) This argument is without legal or logical merit.
Although Kling cites none (seegenerally Respondent's brief), there is legal
authority addressing a court's inherent powers to manage its cases. A court has
"inherent power to regulate its calendar, to efficiently manage the cases before
it." Department of Labor and Indus. Serv. V. East ldaho Mills, Inc., 111 ldaho

137, 138-39, 721 P.2d 736, 737-38 (Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added, internal
citations omitted). This inherent power must be weighed against the court's duty
to "do substantial justice."

Id. Thus, the power to impose deadlines applies only

to active cases, and must not be arbitrary.

The seven-day jurisdictional deadline for filing imposed by the lower courts
is invalid because it does not govern active cases. This case was commenced
upon Kling's filing of a request for a hearing under 1.C. § 18-8002(4)(b). (R., pp.
3-4.) Once

ling requested a hearing and assumed the burden of proving a

justified refusal to submit to a requested BAC test, a sworn statement by the
officer was not even required. In re Hanson, 121 ldaho 507, 511-12, 826 P.2d
468, 472-73 (1992) ("Nothing in 1.C. § 18-8002(4)(b) requires an affidavit where
there has been a request by the driver for a hearing on his license suspension. If
such a hearing is requested, then the court's decision will be based upon the
evidence and testimony admitted at the hearing, not on any affidavit.") Because
the sworn statement was irrelevant to whether Kling could prove one of the
grounds justifying refusal, the magistrate was not exercising any inherent power
to manage the case before him.
Likewise, the deadline is arbitrary and does not balance the effective
administration of the court with "substantial justice" for two reasons. First, the
affidavit is entirely superfluous to the case before the magistrate. In re Hanson,
121 ldaho at 51 1-12, 826 P.2d at 472-73.

Because no such affidavit was

required in this case the seven-day filing requirement was no benefit to case
management whatsoever, much less one that overcomes the obligation to do
substantial justice. Second, even if the seven-day deadline conferred some
benefit to management of the case the dismissal in this case was not based on
any prejudice by the petitioner and the deadline was arbitrary.

The court

performed no balancing required for the imposition of sanctions, but instead

treated the seven-day filing as a jurisdictional prerequisite rather than a
scheduling order. The court lacked authority to so limit its jurisdiction and acted
arbitrarily rather than balancing the need to manage its calendar against the
requirement to do substantial justice.
The seven-day deadline imposed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal
was beyond the scope of the district court's authority. The argument that the
court was merely efficiently managing this case does not withstand analysis.
C.

The Advisow Was Not Defective Or Vague Under The Applicable Statutes
The notice in this case was adequate, and the lower courts therefore

erred, because that notice accurately informed Kling that if she refused the
requested BAC test her driving privileges in ldaho would be suspended; that she
would retain temporary driving privileges in ldaho for 30 days; and that she had
the right to challenge the suspension by filing a request for hearing within seven
days.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8.)

Kling does not dispute that the advisory

accurately notified her of what actually happened upon her refusal. Kling instead
argues that the suspension advisory was defective because it did not state that
her out-of-state license would be physically seized and a temporary permit
issued, and the statute does not specifically provide for suspension of privileges
without physical seizure of the license and issuance of a physical temporary
permit. (Respondent's brief, pp. 6-15.)
In making her argument, Kling relies primarily on In re Druffel, 136 ldaho
853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002) (discussed at Respondent's brief, pp. 13-15). It does
not appear, however, that this case is even relevant.

In Druffel the ldaho

Supreme Court affirmed a district court's order reversing an ldaho Transportation
Department decision denying Druffel restricted driving privileges during the
course of his suspension for an excessive BAC based solely on his nonresidence in Idaho. Druffel, 136 ldaho at 855-57, 41 P.3d at 741-43. The court
held that nonresidents "can apply for restricted driving privileges under I.C. § 188002A(9) so long as the nonresident applicant meets one of the circumstances
listed in subsection (9)."

Id.at 857, 41 P.3d at 743.

In addressing whether the

district court had reversed the initial suspension of driving privileges on this
basis, however, the Court stated, "It does not appear that Druffel's suspension
was reversed."

a. at 857, 41 P.3d at 743.

Had the matter been remanded,

instead of appealed, the only decision by ITD would have been whether Druffel
receive restricted driving privileges during the course of his suspension.
857-58, 41 P.3d at 743-44.

Id. at

Because this case in no way addressed the

adequacy of the notice provided to Druffel, and addressed only whether a
nonresident can be denied restricted privileges during the course of a
suspension, the Druffel decision has no application in this case.
There is a small variance between the statute and the notice (and
practice), when it comes to out-of-state driver's licenses.' The statute does not
differentiate between in-state and out-of-state licenses, but requires providing
temporary driving privileges for thirty days pending suspension, by issuance of a

' The variance arises because the interstate Driver's License Compact does not
allow the state of ldaho to issue a license to an out-of-state driver who has not
surrendered her out-of-state license. I.C. § 49-2001, Art. V. The provision is to
prevent persons from having simultaneous driver's licenses in multiple states.

temporary permit.

I.C. § 18-8002(4)(a); see also I.C. § 18-8002(3)(b). The

notice differentiates the manner in which the refusing driver retains driving
privileges for thirty days pending suspension, with an in-state driver having her
license physically taken and a temporary permit issued and an out-of-state driver
merely having the license she has be deemed valid in ldaho for thirty more days.
(R., p. 9.) Because the notice conveys that the driver will have driving privileges

for an additional thirty days before the suspension, the notice does accurately
state the consequences of refusal, namely temporary driving privileges, followed
by a one-year suspension, unless the driver shows cause in court.
"Defendant [sic] must establish cause of a sufficient magnitude that it may
be fairly said that a suspension of his license would be unjust or inequitable."
re Griffiths, 113 ldaho 364, 372, 744 P.2d 92, 100 (1987). Kling has failed to
establish that the difference between physical seizure of her out-of-state license
and issuing a temporary permit valid for 30 days, and allowing her to physically
retain her driver's license but with an understanding it would be valid in ldaho for
only 30 days, is such that would make suspension of her license for refusal of a
BAC test unjust or inequitable.

Moreover, Kling can prevail under this standard

only if she can show that she was not "completely advised of [her] rights and
duties under the statute."

Id. at

370, 744 P.2d at 98. There is no reason to

believe that Kling, or anyone else, would be misled as to the consequences of
refusal under the statute where she was correctly informed that she would retain
driving privileges for only thirty days, and thereafter a one-year suspension would
be in effect, unless she successfully showed cause why her license should not

be suspended.

See Head v.

State, 137 ldaho 1, 43 P.3d 760 (2002) (error in

notice unrelated to decision to not take test not grounds for refusing to impose
'

suspension). Thus, although there is a small variance between the statute and
the notice, there was no variance between the notice and the actual "rights and
duties under the statute" such that it would be "unjust or inequitable" to suspend
Kling's license for refusal.
Kling also contends that the notice fails to inform out-of-state motorists
that their licenses will be suspended if they refuse the requested BAC test.
(Respondent's brief, pp. 10-12.) The form very clearly states, however, that if the
driver refuses the BAC testing her license will be "valid in ldaho for thirty (30)
days" and that if no hearing is requested or if the driver does not prevail at a
requested hearing her "license will be suspended with absolutely no driving
privileges for one ( I ) year ...." (R., p. 9.) Kling's claim is without merit.
Finally, the cases in which the appellate courts have found the notice
inadequate are easily distinguishable from this case. In In re Virqil, 126 ldaho
946, 895 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1995), the notice informed Virgil that if he refused
the proffered test his license would be suspended and he would be given a
temporary permit "unless you have a Commercial driver's license."

Id. at 947,

895 P.2d at 183. The court reasoned that the quoted clause did not clearly apply
to only the issuance of a temporary permit but could reasonably be construed as
saying that a commercial license would not be suspended.

Id. Thus, the notice

failed to "completely" inform Virgil, who had a commercial driver's license, of the
consequences of his refusal.

Id.

In In re Beem, 119 ldaho 289, 805 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1991), the notice
informed Beem that his license would be suspended for 120 days if he refused,
even though the statute had been amended to provide for a 180-day suspension.
Id. at 290, 805 P.2d 496. Based on this discrepancy the magistrate declined to
suspend Beem's license for 180 days and instead ordered a 120-day
suspension.

Id. The ldaho Court of Appeals reversed the magistrate and upheld

the ruling of the district court that the statute did not authorize the adjustment of
the penalty to fit the notice, but instead required the notice to accurately convey
the penalty.

Id. at

290-92, 805 P.2d at 496-98. "Beem had the right to be

correctly advised by the officer of the true consequences of refusing to take the
blood-alcohol test, i.e., that his license would be suspended for 180 days."

Id.at

292, 805 P.2d at 498.
Finally, the ldaho Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that failure to inform a
motorist of the right to independent testing at his own expense would have been
cause to challenge the suspension. In re Griffiths, 113 ldaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d
92, 98 (1987). Such oversight was corrected, however, because Griffiths was
later informed of the right and still refused testing.

Id.

Neither Beem, Virgil, nor Griffiths stand for the proposition that any
variance whatsoever from the statutory language will result in a showing of cause
why the test was refused.

Rather, they stand for the proposition that an

inadequate explanation of the actual rights under the statute or the
consequences of refusal will so result. Here Kling failed to show that there was

any failure to accurately apprise her of her rights or the consequences of her
refusal.
The magistrate and the district court were concerned that the statute
discusses only the physical seizing of the driver's license and issuance of a
temporary permit, while the notice (and the practice) was to seize only ldaho
driver's licenses while allowing physical retention of out-of-state licenses that
would be valid in ldaho for only 30 more days. Although the statute does not
differentiate between in-state and out-of-state licenses, Kling ultimately failed to
show that the notice did not adequately inform her of the consequences of her
refusal. It is highly unlikely that Kling actually wanted her license physically
taken, and equally unlikely that the manner in which she would retain driving
privileges for 30 days pending the one-year suspension for refusal influenced her
decision to refuse. Because the notice accurately informed Kling of what did
actually happened upon her refusal she failed to demonstrate that suspension of
her driving privileges was unjust or inequitable. The magistrate (and district
court) therefore erred in dismissing the case rather than suspending Kling's
driving privileges.
D.

Klinq Is Not Entitled To Costs Or Attorneys Fees
Kling did not cross-appeal the lowers courts' denial of her request for

costs and fees. Thus, this issue is not presently before the court.

See I.A.R. 15.

Likewise, Kling is not entitled to costs or attorney fees on appeal as she
has failed to show that the state pursued this appeal unreasonably and the state
anticipates being the prevailing party.
9

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Kling failed to carry her burden of
demonstrating any entitlement to attorneys fees or costs on appeal. Kling has
the burden of showing a statutory or contractual right to attorney fees. Sanchez
v. ldaho Dept. of Correction, 143 ldaho 239, 243, 141 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2006)
(discussing "American rule" that parties generally bear own attorney fees).
Moreover, Kling must show a specific waiver of sovereign immunity before he
may collect attorney fees from the state.

Id. at 244,

141 P.3d at 1113. Kling

cites to I.C. § 12-117 (Respondent's brief, pp. 20-21), but that section is only a
partial waiver of sovereign immunity for judicial actions involving a "state agency"
as that term is defined in I.C. $j 67-5201, I.C. § 12-117(4)(b). Kling does not
claim, and has therefore failed to show, that this case is being litigated by a state
agency as defined in the law. She has therefore failed to show a statutory basis
for her claim and a waiver of sovereign immunity.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court and
the magistrate's order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings on
whether Kling can show one of the justifications allowed by law.
DATED this 18th day of June 2010.
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